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Abstract  
Conservation areas (CAs) are among the most restrictive English planning policies. 
Designation implies a significant limitation of owners’ control over the shape and appearance 
of their properties. The policy, however, can also be argued to solve a sort of ‘prisoners’ 
dilemma’, in which it might be collectively rationale to preserve the character of an area, but 
an individual homeowner may be tempted to inappropriately alter their property, thus free-
riding on nearby properties’ character. The net-benefit of the policy depends largely on the 
existence of positive ‘heritage effects’ and acknowledgement from homeowners that policy 
contributes to neighbourhood stability and the preservation of these positive effects. Our 
results of a mixed-method analysis of close to 1 million property transactions near to about 
8000 CAs and 111 interviews with residents in nine representative CAs in Greater London 
suggest that positive heritage externalities exist and that residents in CAs tend to value their 
local environments, acknowledge the need for planning control and execute their right to 
object to neighbour’s planning request. 
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1 Introduction	  
The	  setting	  aside	  and	  protecting	  of	  areas	  of	  special	  architectural,	  historic	  or	  cultural	  interest	  is	  a	  long	  established	  part	  of	  planning	  in	  the	  North	  American	  and	  European	  context.	  	  From	  the	  initial	  historic	  districts	  of	  Charleston,	  South	  Carolina	   in	  1931	  and	  New	  Orleans,	  Louisiana	   in	  1937	   in	  America	   (Gale,	  1991)	   to	   the	  Civic	  Amenities	   act	   in	   the	  United	  Kingdom	   in	  1967,	  which	   set	  up	  conservation	   areas	   (CAs),	   historic	   districts	   have	   proved	   a	   popular	  way	   of	   protecting	   and	   en-­‐hancing	  buildings	  and	  landscapes	  of	  local	  importance.	  	  The	  policy	  rhetoric	  behind	  the	  conserva-­‐tion	  of	  these	  spaces,	  at	  least	  in	  England,	  is	  based	  on	  the	  benefits	  that	  the	  areas	  are	  purported	  to	  bring	  to	  neighbourhoods	  and	  communities.	   	  These	  are	  wide-­‐ranging	  and	   include	  economic	  re-­‐generation,	   enhanced	  environmental	  quality,	   stronger	  place-­‐based	   identity,	  more	  active	   social	  communities	   and	   the	   provision	   of	   better	   quality	   more	   creative	   new	   build	   (HM	   Government,	  2010).	  	  	  
	  However,	  despite	  their	  appeal	  the	  districts	  have	  also	  met	  with	  critics	  who	  worry	  about	  the	  eco-­‐nomic	   impacts	   designation	   may	   have	   on	   property	   owners	   and	   the	   impingement	   of	   property	  rights	  that	  these	  designated	  districts	  naturally	  imply	  (See	  Glaeser,	  2011;	  Glaeser,	  2010).	  	  A	  great	  deal	  of	  research	  has	  gone	   into	  the	  financial	   impact	  of	  designation	   in	  a	  number	  of	  national	  and	  local	  contexts	  (Zahirovic-­‐Herbert	  &	  Chatterjee,	  2012,	  Ahlfeldt	  &	  Maennig,	  2010;	  Diaz	  et	  al,	  2008,	  Leichenko	  et	  al,	  2001,	  Koster,	  Van	  Ommeren,	  &	  Rietveld,	  2012),	  most	  of	  which	  indicate	  a	  gener-­‐ally	   positive	   price	   impact	   on	   properties.	   	   However,	   relatively	   less	   is	   understood	   about	   other	  tensions	  that	  may	  exist	  in	  these	  districts.	  	  One	  of	  these	  tensions	  is	  a	  sort	  of	  ‘prisoners‘	  dilemma	  ‘whereby	  all	   those	   living	   inside	  an	  historic	  district	  benefit	   from	  localised	  heritage	  amenity	  but	  individual	  property	  owners	  may	  be	  tempted	  to	  inappropriately	  alter	  or	  not	  adequately	  maintain	  their	  properties	   thus	   ‘free-­‐riding’	  on	   the	  overall	  character	  of	   the	  area	  (Coulson	  &	  Lahr,	  2005).	  	  Historic	  preservation	  then	  represents	  an	  instance	  where,	  in	  game-­‐theory	  terms,	  a	  co-­‐ordination	  problem	   exists.	   	   Here	   all	   parties	   could	   gain	   from	   the	   conservation	   of	   their	   neighbourhood	  through	  heightened	  amenity	  and	  raised	  property	  values,	  but	   in	  order	   to	   realise	   this	  gain	  resi-­‐dents	   are	   required	   to	  make	  mutually	   consistent	   decisions	   about	   the	   alteration	   and	  upkeep	  of	  their	  properties.	  The	  situation	  corresponds	  to	  the	  standard	  welfare	  economics	  problem	  where	  a	  
non-­‐pecuniary	  externality	  that	  cannot	  be	  traded	  on	  an	  economic	  market	  leads	  to	  a	  misallocation	  of	  resources	  since	  external	  costs	  and	  benefits	  are	  not	  taken	  into	  account	  in	  the	  market	  equilibri-­‐um.	   	   These	   types	   of	   coordination	  problems	  have	   also	   been	   examined	   in	   the	   context	   of	   home-­‐
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ownership	  and	  social	  capital	  investment	  (Hilber,	  2010	  and	  DiPasquale	  &	  Glaeser,	  1999)	  and	  in	  the	  shaping	  of	  landuse	  regulation	  (Hilber	  &	  Robert-­‐Nicoud,	  2013).	  
	  The	  theoretical	  answer	  to	  the	  problem	  is	  regulation,	  which	  must	  ensure	  that	  the	  external	  effects	  are	  reflected	   in	   individual	  behaviour	  either	  by	  means	  of	   incentives	  or	  binding	  standards.	   	  The	  practical	  question,	  however,	  is	  if	  regulation	  can	  realistically	  overcome	  this	  co-­‐ordination	  prob-­‐lem	  in	  light	  of	  large	  enforcement	  costs	  and	  if	  so,	  how?	  	  Our	  work	  shows	  that	  in	  many	  cases	  this	  co-­‐ordination	  problem	  can	  be	  overcome,	  however	   the	  mechanisms	   for	   this	   are	  more	   complex	  than	  simple	  regulation;	  evolutionary	  concepts	  of	  reciprocity	  and	  group	  selection	  also	  play	  a	  role	  in	  the	  rectification	  of	  the	  prisoners’	  dilemma.	  	  
	  What	   we	  will	   demonstrate	   is	   that,	   in	   the	   first	   instance,	   positive	   heritage	   externalities,	   which	  create	  the	  co-­‐coordination	  problem,	  do	  exist.	  	  Controlling	  for	  other	  factors,	  the	  price	  of	  a	  proper-­‐ty	  significantly	  increases	  the	  closer	  it	  is	  located	  to	  (other)	  heritage	  buildings,	  within	  and	  outside	  CAs.	   In	   addition,	  we	   show	   that	   residents	  not	  only	   value	   their	   local	   environments,	   considering	  them	  to	  be	  attractive	  and	  distinctive,	  they	  also	  value	  the	  planning	  system	  as	  a	  way	  of	  preserving	  local	  amenity.	   	  Moreover,	  when	  residents	   feel	   that	   their	  neighbour’s	  planning	  application	  may	  damage	  their	  enjoyment	  of	  this	  amenity	  they	  are	  more	  than	  prepared	  to	  become	  involved	  in	  the	  planning	  process.	  We	  conclude	  that	  the	  policy	  creates	  a	  framework,	  which	  residents	  use	  –	  even	  beyond	   the	  mere	   legal	   scope	  of	   the	   legislation	  –	   to	   solve	  a	  collective	  decision	  dilemma,	  which	  would	   otherwise	   be	   difficult	   to	   escape	   due	   to	   prohibitive	   cost	   of	   bilateral	   coordination.	   In	   so	  doing,	  this	  research	  offers	  unique	  insights	  into	  the	  ‘meanings	  of	  value’	  (Lee,	  2006)	  and	  the	  value	  of	  regulation	  in	  conservation	  areas.	  	  In	  order	  to	  illustrate	  this	  we	  combine	  two	  primary	  strands	  of	  literature	  on	  heritage	  preservation.	   	  The	  first	  deals	  with	  relative	  price	  effects	  of	  designation	  on	  properties	  (Ahlfeldt	  &	  Manennig,	  2010;	  Coulson,	  &	  Lahr,	  M.	  2005;	  Lazrak,	  et	  al	  2013)	  where	  the	   second	  explores	   the	  meaning	  of	  heritage	  and	   its	   value	  as	   a	  public	  policy	  goal	   (Lowenthal,	  1985;	  Lowenthal,	  1996;	  Townshend	  &	  Pendlebury,	  1999;	  Pendlebury,	  2009).1	  We	  then	  apply	  a	  robust	  approach	  that	  combines	  quantitative	  econometric	  techniques	  with	  qualitative	  interview	  data	  and	  show	  that	  designation	  itself	  does	  not	  necessarily	  come	  with	  a	  net	  cost	  to	  the	  owner	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  	   The	  existing	  literature	  has	  also	  made	  use	  of	  contingent	  valuation	  methods	  to	  assess	  the	  value	  of	  herit-­‐age	  (e.g.	  Alberini	  &	  Longo,	  2009).	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that	  owners	  derive	  value	  from	  a	  multiplicity	  of	  factors	  embedded	  in	  the	  concrete	  relational	  eco-­‐nomic	  geographies	  of	  place.	  
	  This	  paper	  proceeds	  as	   follows;	  Section	  2	   introduces	  the	  key	  components	  of	   the	  prisoners’	  di-­‐lemma	   and	   emergent	   co-­‐operative	   strategies	   as	  well	   as	   the	   practice	   of	   preservation	   policy	   in	  England	  before	  outlining	  our	  methodology	  for	  this	  mixed-­‐methods	  study.	  	  Section	  3	  explores	  the	  quantitative	   material	   taken	   from	   over	   8,000	   CAs	   and	   over	   a	   million	   property	   transactions,	  which	  help	  us	  to	  establish	  the	  abovementioned	  price	  effects	  within	  and	  just	  outside	  CAs.	  	  In	  Sec-­‐tion	   4	   we	   utilise	   our	   qualitative	   data	   of	   surveys	   and	   in-­‐depth	   interviews	   with	   residents	   and	  property	  professionals	  in	  nine	  selected	  CAs	  in	  London	  to	  establish	  the	  value	  residents	  placed	  on	  living	   in	  a	  CA	  and	  their	  attitudes	  and	  behaviours	  with	  regard	  to	  planning	  regulation.	  The	  final	  section	  concludes	  offering	  key	  insights	  into	  cooperative	  behaviour	  and	  planning	  illustrating	  the	  importance	  of	  values,	  reciprocity	  and	  group-­‐level	  selection	  in	  overcoming	  the	  prisoner’s	  dilem-­‐ma	  and	  fostering	  neighbourhood	  co-­‐ordination.	  	  
2 Theory,	  institutional	  setting,	  and	  empirical	  strategy	  
2.1 	  Co-­‐operation	  and	  Co-­‐ordination	  in	  the	  Prisoners’	  Dilemma	  Simply	  put,	  “the	  prisoners’	  dilemma	  illustrates	  the	  tension	  between	  private	  and	  common	  inter-­‐est.”	  (Rand	  et	  al,	  2009:	  p.272).	  	  It	  has	  been	  used	  as	  tool	  to	  understand	  co-­‐operation	  and	  competi-­‐tion	  in	  fields	  like	  evolutionary	  biology	  and	  as	  a	  rational	  way	  of	  explaining	  human	  behaviour	  in	  economics	  and	  politics.	  	  It	  is	  also	  not	  a	  new	  concept	  for	  planners.	  	  Both	  Terry	  Moore	  (1978)	  and	  Richard	   Klostermann	   (1985)	   in	   separate	   articles,	   showed	   how	   economic	   theory,	   especially	  where	  it	  relates	  to	  public	  goods	  and	  issues	  of	  co-­‐operation	  and	  co-­‐ordination,	  could	  offer	  a	  con-­‐vincing	  justification	  for	  the	  practice	  of	  planning.	  	  	  
	  In	   its	   classic	   form,	   the	   prisoners’	   dilemma	   relates	   to	   two	   co-­‐conspirators	   in	   crime	  who,	   once	  caught,	  face	  the	  difficult	  choice	  of	  co-­‐operation	  or	  defection.	  	  If	  both	  remain	  silent	  (co-­‐operation)	  each	  will	  receive	  a	  two-­‐year	  sentence;	  however,	   if	  one	  defects	  and	  confesses	  and	  the	  other	  re-­‐mains	  silent	  the	  defector	  receives	  a	  one-­‐year	  sentence	  and	  the	  co-­‐operator	  is	  left	  with	  the	  ‘suck-­‐er’s	  payoff’,	  a	  four-­‐year	  sentence.	  	  As	  both	  prisoners	  know	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  game	  ahead	  of	  time	  it	  creates	  a	  situation	  where	  the	  rational	  choice	   is	   to	  defect	  and	  confess	  since,	  conditional	  on	  any	  choice	   of	   the	   counterpart,	   the	   individual	   outcome	   will	   be	   superior	   to	   the	   alternative	   of	   co-­‐operation.	  The	  individually	  rationale	  outcome	  (3	  years	  for	  both),	  the	  Nash	  equilibrium,	  howev-­‐
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er,	   is	   not	   collectively	   rationale	   since	   it	   is	   inferior	   to	   the	   (unstable)	   situation	   of	   mutual	   co-­‐operation	  (2	  years	  for	  both).	  	  The	  following	  payoff	  matrix	  determines	  their	  choices.	  



























2 years in jail 
2 years in jail 
4 years in jail 








1 year in jail 
4 years in jail 
3 years in jail 
3 years in jail 
	  When	  this	  scenario	  is	  extended	  to	  more	  than	  two	  players	  it	  is	  known	  of	  as	  a	  public	  goods	  game	  (Rand	  et	  al,	  2009).	  	  In	  this	  incarnation	  there	  are	  common	  pool	  resources	  that	  are	  non-­‐rivalrours	  and	  non-­‐excludable	  meaning	  that	  the	  use	  of	  the	  resource	  by	  one	  actor	  does	  not	  preclude	  its	  use	  by	  another	  nor	  is	  it	  possible	  to	  exclude	  individuals	  from	  using	  the	  resource.	  	  Given	  these	  charac-­‐teristics,	  the	  effect	  of	  individual	  actions	  on	  others	  (externality)	  is	  non-­‐pecuniary	  and	  cannot	  be	  traded	  on	  (economic)	  markets,	  a	  market	  failure.	  Any	  externality	  will	  remain	  unconsidered	  in	  a	  market	  equilibrium	  that	  resembles	  the	  Nash	  equilibrium	  in	  the	  sense	  that	   it	   is	   individually	  ra-­‐tionale,	   but	   co-­‐operation	  would	  be	  welfare	  maximizing	   (collectively	   rationale).	   The	   lack	  of	   an	  economic	  market	  corresponds	  to	  the	  physical	  separation	  of	  the	  actors	  in	  the	  prison’s	  dilemma,	  which	  makes	  the	  cost	  of	  co-­‐ordination	  prohibitive.	  	  An	  example	  in	  planning	  terms	  might	  be	  the	  upkeep	  of	  residential	  property,	  which	  benefits	  all	  residents	  by	  increasing	  property	  values	  in	  the	  neighbourhood	   and	   is	   therefore	   non-­‐excludable	   (Terry,	   1978).	   	   The	   prisoners’	   dilemma	   here	  arises	  from	  free-­‐riders	  and	  is	  most	  classically	  described	  by	  Hardin’s	  (1968)	  tragedy	  of	  the	  com-­‐
mons	  whereby	  common	  pool	  resources	  are	  exploited	  by	  users	  who	  do	  nothing	  to	  maintain	  them	  leading	  to	  their	  ultimate	  destruction.	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  However,	  an	  over-­‐reliance	  on	  homo	  economicus	  as	  the	  arbiter	  of	  decision-­‐making	  in	  human	  rela-­‐tions	   has	   been	   challenged	   (see	   Henrich,	   et	   al,	  2001;	   Gintis,	   2000)	   and	   evidence	   from	   experi-­‐mental	   public	   goods	   games	  would	   indicate	   that	   actual	   responses	   tend	   to	   rest	   somewhere	   be-­‐tween	  complete	  defection	  and	  complete	  co-­‐operation	  (Cressman,	  et	  al,	  2012)	  and	  depend	  great-­‐ly	  on	  societal	  norms	  of	  behaviour	  (Henrich	  et	  al,	  2001).	  	  	  
	  So,	  why	  might	  co-­‐operation	  emerge	  in	  the	  face	  of	  competition?	  	  Here,	  turning	  to	  the	  field	  of	  evo-­‐lutionary	  biology,	  we	  see	  five	  mechanisms	  that	  drive	  co-­‐operative	  behaviour:	  direct	  reciprocity,	  indirect	   reciprocity,	   kin	   selection,	   group	   selection,	   and	  network	   reciprocity	   (Taylor	  &	  Nowak,	  2007).	  Of	  these,	  direct	  reciprocity,	  indirect	  reciprocity	  and	  group	  selection	  are	  most	  relevant	  to	  our	  work.	   	  Briefly,	  direct	  reciprocity	  occurs	   in	   two	  person	  games	  where	  repeated	   interactions	  help	   to	   shape	  behaviour.	   	   So,	   for	   example,	   in	   colonies	   of	   vampire	   bats,	   altruistic	   food	   sharing	  occurs	  and	  studies	  have	  shown	  that	  those	  bats	  that	  have	  been	  generous	  in	  the	  past	  are	  remem-­‐bered	  when	  they	  are	  in	  need	  and	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  receive	  assistance	  (Nowak,	  2012).	  	  Indirect	  reciprocity	  takes	  this	  notion	  further	  and	  postulates	  that	  my	  behaviour	  will	  depend	  on	  how	  you	  have	  behaved	  to	  others	  in	  the	  past.	  	  In	  other	  words	  indirect	  reciprocity	  has	  a	  reputational	  effect	  and,	   “…arises	   out	   of	   direct	   reciprocity	   in	   the	   presence	   of	   interested	   audiences.”	   (Alexander,	  1987	  cited	  in	  Taylor	  &	  Nowak,	  2007:2284).	  	  Group	  selection	  contains	  within	  it	  the	  notion	  of	  the	  
greater	  good	  and	  is	  predicated	  on	  the	  understanding	  that	  groups	  of	  co-­‐operators	  can	  out	  com-­‐pete	  groups	  of	  defectors.	  	  	  
	  In	  addition	  to	  understanding	  the	  evolutionary	  mechanisms	  by	  which	  co-­‐ordination	  may	  emerge	  it	  is	  also	  important	  to	  discuss	  what	  role	  regulation	  may	  play	  in	  facilitating	  co-­‐operation.	   	  Here,	  as	  stated	  before,	  authors	   like	  Moore	   (1978)	  and	  Klostermann	  (1985)	  have	  made	  cogent	  argu-­‐ments	  as	  to	  how	  planning	  could	  serve	  as	  means	  to	  overcome	  negative	  market	  externalities.	  	  So	  too,	  Voogd	  (2001)	  illustrated	  the	  importance	  of	  government	  and	  regulation	  when	  applied	  to	  the	  preservation	   of	   urban	  heritage.	   	   In	   each	   instance	   the	   authors	   argue	   that	   planning	   serves	   as	   a	  framework	  through	  which	  collective	  good	  can	  be	  understood	  and	  protected	  from	  individuated	  interests.	   	   By	   way	   of	   example,	   Voogd	   (2001)	   gives	   us	   the	   case	   of	   Appingedam,	   Netherlands,	  where	   local	   shopkeepers	  wanted	   to	  construct	  awnings	  over	   their	  shops,	  protecting	  customers	  from	  wind	  and	  rain	  but	  disrupting	  building	  façades	  and	  the	  historic	  fabric	  of	  the	  street.	  	  Whilst	  the	  public	  was	  ”…slightly	   in	   favour	  of	   this	   idea”	   the	   local	  council	   tenaciously	  stood	  by	  historic	  preservation	  regulations	  recognising	  the	  amenity	  value	  of	  heritage	  to	  the	  local	  economy	  (IBID:	  p.	  81-­‐82).	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  In	   fact,	   looking	   at	   the	   literature	   on	   heritage	   from	   a	   real	   estate	   perspective	  we	   see	   additional	  support	  for	  historic	  preservation	  policies	  as	  a	  means	  to	  overcome	  the	  prisoners’	  dilemma	  (Ahl-­‐feldt	  &	  Maennig,	  2010).	  	  Here	  the	  arguments	  are	  that,	  given	  free	  market	  equilibriums,	  there	  will	  be	  an	  under	  provision	  of	  heritage	  conservation	  as	  owners	  will	  not	  be	  compensated	  for	  maintain-­‐ing	  their	  properties	  (Coulson	  and	  Leichenko,	  2001).	  	  In	  this	  instance	  preservation	  policies,	  par-­‐ticularly	  those	  that	  apply	  to	  entire	  districts,	  help	  to	  impose	  regulations	  like	  maintenance	  obliga-­‐tions	   that	  ultimately	  benefit	   the	  neighbourhood	  as	   a	  whole	   (Coulson	  &	  Lahr,	   2005).	   	   There	   is	  also	   evidence	   that	   these	   policies	   communicate	   an	   overall	   public	   commitment	   to	   the	   area	  (Schaeffer	  &	  Millerick,	  1991),	  thereby	  making	  investors	  less	  wary	  and	  add	  a	  certain	  prestige	  to	  places	  (Leichenko	  et	  al,	  2001)	  providing	  a	  psychological	  fillip	  to	  homeowners	  and	  residents	  in	  terms	   of	   how	   they	   value	   their	   properties.	   What	   we	   would	   now	   like	   to	   illustrate	   is	   how	   co-­‐operative	   strategies	  may	   emerge	  within	   the	   framework	  of	   regulation	   in	  CAs	   thus	   overcoming	  the	  prisoners’	  dilemma	  as	  described	  earlier.	  	  
2.2 	  Conservation	  area	  policy	  and	  co-­‐operative	  behaviour	  	  English	   planning	   has	   been	   the	   subject	   of	   frequent	   criticism	   from	   economists	   (Cheshire	   2013;	  Barker,	  2006)	  and	  politicians	  who	  claim	  that,	  as	  a	  restrictive	  system,	  it	  is	  a	  brake	  on	  the	  econo-­‐my	  and	  a	  driver	  of	  house	  price	  inflation.	  	  Here,	  the	  argument	  goes	  that	  as	  any	  change	  of	  landuse	  requires	  planning	  permission,	  as	  development	   rights	  were	  nationalised	   in	  1947,	   supply	   is	  un-­‐necessarily	   restricted	  driving	  prices	   ever	  upwards.	   	  Whilst	   this	   paper	  does	  not	   deal	  with	   this	  question,	  we	  do	  look	  at	  an	  area	  of	  planning	  policy,	  which	  is	  even	  more	  restrictive	  than	  standard	  planning.	  	  Heritage	  planning,	  or	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  government	  to	  restrict	  property	  owner’s	  rights	  without	  compensation	  to	  alter	  or	  demolish	  structures	  deemed	  valuable	  to	  society,	  came	  about	  by	  an	  accretion	  of	  policy	  from	  the	  1882	  Ancient	  Monument’s	  Protection	  Act	  to	  the	  1953	  Historic	  Buildings	   and	   Monuments	   Act,	   which	   set	   up	   the	   current	   system.	   	   As	   noted	   by	   Pendlebury	  (2009:1)	  one	  of	  the	  striking	  features	  of	  conservation	  policy	  is	  how	  accepted	  it	  has	  become.	  	  	  
Whist	  the	  1953	  Act	  covered	  single	  buildings	  deemed	  to	  have	  heritage	  value,	  it	  was	  not	  until	  the	  passage	   of	   the	   1967	   Civic	   Amenities	   Act	   that	   areas	   could	   be	   statutorily	   described,	   as	   having	  “…special	  architectural	  or	  historic	  interest,	  the	  character	  or	  appearance	  of	  which	  is	  desirable	  to	  preserve	  or	  enhance.”	   (1967	  Act,	  Section	  1).	   	  As	   such,	   conservation	  areas	   represent	  England’s	  attempt	   to	   protect	   not	   simply	   individual	   buildings	   of	   historic	   importance	   but	   also	   groups	   of	  buildings,	  streetscapes,	  trees	  and	  open	  spaces	  that	  form	  significant	  sites	  of	  local	  character.	  	  They	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came	   into	   being	   in	   a	   time	   punctuated	   by	   slum	   clearance	   and	   comprehensive	   redevelopment,	  which	  many	  have	  agreed	  helped	  to	  spur	  the	  development	  of	  the	  legislation	  (Townshend	  &	  Pen-­‐dlebury,	   1999).	   	   Since	   1967,	   some	   9,800	   areas	   have	   been	   designated	   in	   England,	  making	   the	  policy	  a	  significant	  aspect	  of	  local	  planning.	  
	  Unlike	  many	  historic	  districts	  in	  North	  America,	  owners	  of	  properties	  in	  CAs	  typically	  receive	  no	  special	  grants	  or	  assistance	  for	  the	  upkeep	  and	  maintenance	  of	  their	  properties.	  	  CAs	  are	  created	  at	  the	  local	  level	  and	  are	  designated	  by	  local	  planning	  authorities	  (LPAs)	  employing	  local	  or	  re-­‐gional	  criteria.	  	  These	  criteria	  therefore	  vary	  across	  the	  country,	  allowing	  the	  ‘value’	  attached	  to	  heritage	   to	   be	   culturally	   inflected	   (Pendlebury,	   2009)	   highlighting	   the	   complexity	   of	   value	   so	  aptly	  described	  by	  Lee	  (2006).	   In	  practice	  this	  means	  that	  CAs	  can	  range	   from	  masterplanned	  communities	   like	  Hampstead	  Garden	  Suburb	   to	  open	   spaces	   like	  Richmond	  Park	   to	   attractive	  areas	   of	   suburbia	   to	   modernist	   housing	   estates.	   Each	   of	   these	   very	   different,	   locally	   defined	  places	   are	   then	   afforded	   protection	   under	   national	   planning	   legislation	   and	   advice	   issued	   by	  central	  government,	  thus	  reflecting	  the	  wider	  interests	  of	  society.	  	  
	  Once	   an	   area	   has	   been	   designated,	   alterations	   to	   individual	   properties	   require	   ‘Conservation	  Area	  Consent’	   (CAC)	   thus	   limiting	  what	  owners	  may	  do	  with	   their	  properties.	   	   It	   is	  a	   criminal	  offence	  to	  totally	  or	  substantially	  demolish	  any	  building	  within	  a	  CA	  without	  first	  seeking	  con-­‐sent	   from	   the	   LPA.	   In	   cases	   where	   alterations	   to	   the	   property	   require	   planning	   permission,	  owners	   are	   also	   required	   to	   apply	   for	   CAC	   and	   applications	   are	  determined	  based	  on	   the	   en-­‐hancement	  and	  protection	  of	  the	  area.	  	  The	  LPA	  must	  be	  given	  notice	  if	  work	  is	  proposed	  on	  any	  tree	  with	  a	  trunk	  larger	  than	  75mm;	  the	  LPA	  then	  has	  six	  weeks	  to	  determine	  if	  a	  Tree	  Preserva-­‐tion	  Order	  should	  be	  applied.	  Under	  the	  Town	  and	  Country	  Planning	  (General	  Permitted	  Devel-­‐opment	   Order)	   1995	   (revised	   2012),	   householders	   are	   allowed	   to	  make	   certain	   small	   altera-­‐tions	   to	   their	  buildings	  without	   the	  need	   for	  planning	  permission.	   	  However,	   these	  alterations	  may	  be	  construed	  as	  detrimental	   to	   the	   fabric	  of	  CAs	  and	  are	  therefore	  partially	  or	  wholly	  re-­‐stricted.	  	  Householders	  therefore	  must	  apply	  for	  permission	  to	  install	  certain	  types	  of	  cladding,	  roof	  extensions	  and	  side	  and	  rear	  extensions	  of	  more	  than	  one	  storey	  and	  satellite	  dishes	  and	  antennae	  that	  are	  visible	  from	  the	  highway.	  In	  addition	  to	  this,	  the	  GPDO	  gives	  LPA	  and	  the	  Sec-­‐retary	  of	  State	  the	  right	  to	  further	  withdraw	  permitted	  development	  rights	  under	  Article	  4	  di-­‐rectives.	   	   In	   these	   cases,	   LPA	   are	   able	   to	   require	   permission	   to	   be	   sought	   for	   alterations	   like,	  building	   a	   porch,	   removing	   a	   chimney	   or	   replacing	  windows	   and	   exterior	   doors.	   	   As	   of	   2009	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some	  13%	  of	  CAs	   in	  England	  were	  under	   the	  added	  protection	  of	  Article	  4	  directives	  (English	  Heritage,	  2009).	  
2.3 	  Empirical	  strategy	  In	  order	  to	  illustrate	  how	  we	  believe	  certain	  CAs	  are	  overcoming	  the	  co-­‐ordination	  problem	  set-­‐up	  by	  the	  prisoners’	  dilemma	  we	  make	  four	  core	  arguments.	   	   In	  the	  first	  instance	  we	  must	  es-­‐tablish	  that	  there	  is	  a	  pay-­‐off	  to	  co-­‐operation.	  	  Here	  we	  will	  present	  evidence	  from	  our	  quantita-­‐tive	   study,	  which	   has	   established	   that	   prices	   increase	   in	   the	   density	   of	   heritage	   embedded	   in	  CAs.	  	  We	  argue	  that	  these	  effects	  reflect	  a	  non-­‐market	  (heritage)	  externality,	  which	  can	  motivate	  a	   regulation	   that	   seeks	   to	  correct	   individually	   rational	  but	  collectively	   irrational	  behaviour	  by	  setting	  binding	   legal	   rules	   and	   standards.	   Such	   a	   regulation,	   however,	   is	   obviously	  difficult	   to	  enforce	  in	  practice	  due	  to	  the	  cost	  of	  monitoring	  so	  that	  effectiveness	  and	  efficiency	  of	  the	  policy	  depend	  on	  the	  understanding	  and	  participation	  of	  residents.	  	  We	  will	  therefore	  argue	  next,	  that	  in	  order	  for	  the	  dilemma	  to	  be	  overcome,	  residents	  must	  be	  generally	  aware	  that	  a	  price	  effect	  exists	  and	  they	  must	  attach	  some	  sort	  of	  value	  to	  their	  neighbourhoods.	  Our	  third	  point	  is	  that	  for	  this	  regulation	  to	  be	  effective,	  residents	  must	  be	  confident	  in	  using	  it	  to	  help	  enforce	  CA	  poli-­‐cy.	  	  Finally,	  we	  will	  argue	  that	  for	  the	  regulation	  to	  not	  simply	  be	  about	  tit-­‐for-­‐tat	  exchange	  peo-­‐ple	  should	  have	  generally	  positive	  attitudes	  toward	  the	  system.	  
It	  is	  notoriously	  hard	  to	  unpick	  policy	  effects	  using	  solely	  quantitative	  or	  qualitative	  means.	  	  We	  therefore	   employ	   a	   mixed	   methods	   approach,	   which	   has	   allowed	   us	   to	   unite	   both	   socially-­‐critical	  and	  spatially-­‐analytical	  forms	  of	  analysis	  (Sui	  &	  DeLyser,	  2012).	   	   	   In	  Section	  3.1	  we	  we	  will	  present	  a	  spatial	  hedonic	  analysis	  of	  some	  1,088,446-­‐property	  transactions	  that	  took	  place	  between	  1995-­‐2010.	  	  Through	  this	  analysis	  we	  were	  able	  to	  determine	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  her-­‐itage	  externalities	  increase	  property	  values	  within	  or	  near	  to	  8167	  CAs.	  For	   the	   qualitative	   sec-­‐tion	  of	  our	  research	  we	  sought	   to	  better	  understand	  the	  softer	   impacts	  of	  conservation	  policy	  and	  the	  lived	  experience	  of	  residents.	  	  The	  analysis	  presented	  in	  Section	  3.2	  entailed	  111	  inter-­‐views	  and	  surveys	  with	  residents	  in	  nine	  representative	  CAs	  in	  London	  and	  in-­‐depth	  interviews	  with	  conservation	  officers	  in	  each	  of	  the	  selected	  areas.	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3 Property	  price	  analysis	  
3.1 	  Methodology	  Our	  quantitative	   analysis	   started	   from	   the	   conventional	   assumption	   in	   spatial	   economics	   that	  property	  prices	  reflect	  all	  the	  costs	  and	  benefits	  owners	  derive	  from	  the	  location	  of	  their	  prop-­‐erty.	  The	  overall	  net-­‐benefits	  to	  owners	  of	  properties	  in	  CAs	  can	  be	  distinguished	  into	  heritage	  and	  policy	  effects.	  Benefits	  include	  the	  pleasure	  of	  living	  in	  a	  building	  with	  certain	  historic	  and	  aesthetic	  features	  (internal	  heritage	  effect)	  or	  near	  to	  buildings	  with	  similar	  characteristics	  (ex-­‐
ternal	  heritage	  effect).	  In	  addition,	  the	  legal	  status	  of	  designation	  brings	  the	  benefit	  of	  reduced	  uncertainty	  regarding	  the	  future	  of	  the	  neighbourhood	  and	  the	  cost	  of	  increased	  planning	  con-­‐trol,	   i.e.	   development	   restrictions	   and	  maintenance	   obligations	   (policy	   effect).	   Since	   we	   were	  interested	  primarily	  in	  the	  non-­‐market	  heritage	  externality	  we	  focused	  on	  comparing	  how	  pric-­‐es	   changed	  at	  different	  distances	   from	  a	  CA	  boundary,	   both	   internally	   and	  externally.	  The	   ra-­‐tionale	  for	  such	  an	  analysis	  is	  that	  we	  assume	  the	  internal	  heritage	  effect	  and	  the	  policy	  effect	  to	  exist	  inside	  CAs	  alone	  and	  to	  be	  constant	  within	  a	  given	  CA.	  The	  external	  heritage	  effect	  can	  then	  be	   concluded	   from	   spatial	   variation	   in	   prices	   within	   and	   outside	   CAs	   assuming	   that	   the	  strengths	  of	  the	  heritage	  externality	  must	  be	  lower	  at	  locations	  further	  away	  from	  a	  CA	  (larger	  external	  distance)	  and	  higher	  at	  locations	  closer	  to	  the	  centre	  of	  a	  CA	  (larger	  internal	  distance).	  	  
Our	  empirical	  specification	  builds	  on	  the	  seminal	  work	  by	  Rosen	  (1974)	  and	  a	  long	  tradition	  of	  hedonic	  property	  price	  analyses.	   In	   this	   literature,	   the	  price	  of	   the	  composite	  good	  housing	   is	  typically	  expressed	  as	  a	  function	  of	  various	  internal	  and	  locational	  attributes	  and	  their	  implicit	  prices	  that	  can	  be	  estimated	  using	  multivariate	  statistical	  methods.	  	  	  
log 𝑃!" = 𝛼 + 𝛽!𝐼𝐷!"#! + 𝛽!𝐸𝐷!"#!+ 𝛾!𝑆!" + 𝛾!𝐿!" + 𝛾!𝑁!" + 𝜑!"𝑅!"×𝑇!"!! + 𝜀!"!!! 	  	  where	  Pit	  is	  the	  price	  per	  square	  metre	  of	  floor	  space	  of	  a	  property	  i	  that	  sells	  at	  time	  t.	  Sj,	  Lk,	  Nl	  are	  structural	  property,	   location	  and	  neighbourhood	  characteristics.	  εit	   is	  a	  random	  error	  term	  and	  all	  other	  Greek	  letters	  represent	  the	  hedonic	  implicit	  prices	  to	  be	  estimated.	  Rr	  stands	  for	  a	  set	   7,737	   fixed	   effects	   capturing	   location	   characteristics	   that	   are	   common	   to	   properties	   that	  share	  the	  same	  nearest	  conservation	  area.	  Tt	  	  are	  a	  set	  of	  time	  fixed	  effect	  capturing	  unobserved	  shocks	   in	   each	   of	   the	   16	   years	   covered	   by	   the	   analysis.	   The	   resulting	   123,792	   time-­‐location	  𝑅!"×𝑇!" 	  effects	  ensure	  that	  we	  identify	  the	  effect	  associated	  with	  a	  property’s	  location	  relative	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to	   the	  nearest	   conservation	  areas	  controlling	   for	  all	  unobservable	   factors	   that	  are	  common	   to	  any	  CA	  neighbourhood	  in	  a	  given	  year.	  These	  neighbourhoods	  are	  small	  as	  we	  restrict	  the	  sam-­‐ple	  of	  observations	  to	  2km	  surrounding	  any	  of	  the	  conservation	  areas.	  
To	  assess	  how	  property	  prices,	  on	  average,	  depend	  on	  the	  location	  of	  a	  property	  relative	  to	  the	  nearest	  CA	  we	  compute	  the	  distance	  to	  the	  nearest	  CA	  boundary	  for	  each	  of	  the	  transactions	  in	  the	   sample	   in	   GIS.	  We	   then	   define	   impact	   areas	   inside	   and	   outside	   conservation	   areas	   in	   the	  form	  of	  mutually	  exclusive	  50m	  buffers	  in	  either	  direction	  from	  the	  boundary.	  For	  the	  interior,	  we	  define	  nine	  50m	  buffer	  rings	   𝐼𝐷! 	  up	  to	  a	  distance	  of	  450m	  and	  one	  residual	  buffer	  covering	  all	  properties	  that	  are	  located	  inside	  a	  conservation	  area,	  and	  more	  than	  450m	  away	  from	  the	  boundary.	   This	   relatively	   large	   innermost	   buffer	   is	   defined	   in	   response	   to	   a	   relatively	   small	  number	  of	  transactions	  in	  this	  area.	  For	  the	  exterior,	  we	  define	  39	  50m	  buffer	  rings	   𝐸𝐷! 	  up	  to	  a	  distance	  of	  1950m	  to	  allow	  for	  one	  residual	  category	  within	  the	  2km	  conservation	  area	  fixed	  effects	  described	  above.	  The	  parameters	  of	  interest	  are	  𝛽!	  and	  𝛽! ,	  each	  of	  which	  represents	  the	  average	   difference	   between	   the	   sales	   prices	   within	   a	   distance	   ring	   relative	   to	   the	   outermost	  (1950-­‐2000m)	  ring	  across	  all	  neighbourhoods.	  These	  price	  differences	  (log	  terms)	  are	  adjusted	  for	  observable	  property	  and	  location	  effects	  and	  unobservable	  effects	  that	  are	  common	  to	  any	  neighbourhood	  in	  any	  year.	  
We	  note	  that	  we	  control	  for	  whether	  a	  CA	  by	  the	  time	  of	  the	  transaction	  of	  a	  property	  was	  des-­‐ignated	  or	  not.	  The	  effect	  on	   the	  spatial	  property	  price	   trend	   is	  virtually	  zero,	  which	   is	   in	   line	  with	  previous	  evidence	   suggesting	   that	   the	   characteristics	   associated	  with	   conservation	  areas	  impact	  on	  the	  sales	  price,	  the	  designation	  status	  itself	   is	  not	  a	  significant	  determinant	  (Koster,	  Van	  Ommeren,	  &	  Rietveld,	  2012).	  	  
3.2 	  Data	  The	  property	   data	   utilised	   in	   the	   analysis	  were	   provided	  by	   the	  Nationwide	  Building	   Society,	  one	  of	  the	  large	  mortgage	  providers	  in	  England	  with	  a	  market	  share	  of	  about	  10%.	  The	  data	  set	  contains	  the	  selling	  price	  and	  date	  of	  properties	  sold	  between	  1995	  and	  2010	  in	  England	  along	  with	  a	  range	  of	  property	  characteristics	  such	  as	  floor	  space	  (m²),	  the	  type	  of	  property	  (detached,	  semi-­‐detached,	   flat,	  bungalow	  or	   terraced),	   the	  date	  of	   construction,	   the	  number	  of	  bedrooms	  and	  bathrooms,	  garage	  or	  parking	  facilities	  and	  the	  type	  of	  heating.	  The	  data	  also	  come	  with	  the	  full	   postcode	   as	   a	   detailed	   georeference,	  which	   allows	   for	   geocoding	   in	  GIS.	   Previous	   applica-­‐tions	  of	  the	  data	  in	  academic	  research	  include	  e.g.	  Ahlfeldt	  (2013)and	  Gibbons	  &	  Machin	  (2005).	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More	  details	  on	  the	   transactions	  data	  and	  the	  comprehensive	  set	  of	   locational	  and	  neighbour-­‐hood	  control	  data,	  including	  the	  various	  data	  sources,	  is	  provided	  in	  the	  appendix.	  
For	   the	  empirical	  analysis	  we	  merge	  the	  1,088,446	  property	   transactions	  provided	  by	  Nation-­‐wide	  to	  8167	  conservation	  areas	  in	  GIS.	  English	  Heritage	  provided	  the	  exact	  boundaries	  of	  the	  CA	  in	  form	  of	  an	  electronic	  map	  (shapefile).	  In	  the	  econometric	  analysis	  we	  utilise	  830,055	  trans-­‐actions,	  which	  are	  within	  2km	  of	  7,737	  CAs.	  The	  remaining	  transactions	  and	  CAs	  remain	  unconsid-­‐ered	  in	  the	  analysis.	  
3.3.	  Results	  	  In	  Figure	  1,	  we	  plot	   the	  estimated	  𝛽!	   and	  𝛽!	   coefficient	  estimates	   jointly	  with	   the	  95	  per	  cent	  confidence	  intervals.2	  Our	  results	  reveal	  that	  prices	  decline	  as	  one	  moves	  towards	  the	  conserva-­‐tion	  area	  boundary	  from	  the	  inside	  of	  the	  area	  and	  as	  one	  moves	  away	  from	  the	  boundary	  out-­‐side	  the	  area.	  The	  conservation	  area	  premium	  at	  the	  boundary	  (0-­‐50m)	  of	  9.5	  per	  cent	  roughly	  doubles	   once	   the	   innermost	   zone	   is	   reached	   (inside	   the	   CA,	   but	   more	   than	   450m	   from	   the	  boundary).	  This	   increase	   in	  value	   is	   in	   line	  with	  a	  positive	  external	  heritage	  effect	  as	  heritage	  density	  increases	  as	  one	  approaches	  the	  centre	  of	  the	  CA.	  Just	  outside	  the	  conservation	  area	  (0-­‐50m)	  there	  is	  still	  a	  significant	  premium	  of	  close	  to	  5per	  cent.	  This	  external	  premium	  declines	  in	  distance	  and	  becomes	  virtually	  zero	  at	  about	  700m	  and	  statistically	  indistinguishable	  from	  zero	  at	  about	  500m.	  Again,	  this	  spatial	  trend	  is	  in	  line	  with	  a	  positive	  external	  heritage	  effect,	  as	  the	  benefit	  of	  being	  close	  to	  a	  CA	  should	  be	  associated	  with	  both	  its	  relative	  visibility	  and	  ‘visitabil-­‐ity’	   from	   the	   effected	  property.	  This	   spatial	   scope	  of	   the	   effect	   is	   very	   similar	   to	   the	   evidence	  provided	  by	  Ahlfeldt	  and	  Maennig	   (2010),	  who	  detect	  heritage	  externalities	  within	  a	   range	  of	  about	  600m,	  though	  in	  a	  different	  institutional	  context	  (Berlin,	  Germany).	  	  
Another	  interesting	  feature	  of	  Figure	  1	  is	  the	  relatively	  steep	  decline	  in	  prices	  per	  square	  metre	  as	  one	  moves	  from	  the	  inner	  0-­‐50m	  ring	  to	  the	  outer	  0-­‐50m	  ring	  (about	  5%).	  These	  results	  are	  in	  line	  with	  Koster,	  Van	  Ommeren,	  &	  Rietveld	  (2012)	  who	  found	  a	  similar	  discontinuity	  at	  con-­‐servation	   area	   boundaries	   in	   the	   Netherlands.	   Several	   (non-­‐exclusive)	   explanations	   may	   ac-­‐count	  for	  this	  pattern.	  Firstly,	  the	  external	  heritage	  effect	  will	  decline	  abruptly	  as	  one	  moves	  out	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	   The	   effects	  measured	   in	   log-­‐differences	   can	   be	   interpreted	   approximately	   in	   percentage	   terms.	   The	  exact	   percentage	   premium	   can	   be	   computed	   according	   to	   the	   standard	   formula	   (Halvorsen	   &	  Palmquist,	  1980).	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of	  the	  conservation	  area	  if	  a	  significant	  proportion	  is	  attributable	  to	  an	  aesthetic	  utility	  and	  the	  visibility	  of	  historic	  properties,	  which	  in	  most	  settings	  is	  limited	  to	  a	  very	  local	  area,	  e.g.	  due	  to	  narrow	  streets	  and	  frequent	  corners.	  Secondly,	  there	  could	  be	  an	  internal	  heritage	  effect,	  which	  determines	   the	   boundary	   of	   the	   conservation	   area,	   and	   directly	   capitalises	   into	   the	   price	   of	  buildings	  with	  such	  characteristics.	  Thirdly,	  there	  may	  be	  other	  benefits	  such	  as	  a	  specific	  place	  identity	   and	   a	   particular	   community	   involvement	   from	   which	   residents	   receive	   a	   utility	   and	  which	  are	  exclusive	  to	  the	  area	  inside	  the	  conservation	  area	  boundary.	  	  
While	  the	  discontinuity	  at	  the	  boundary	  can	  be	  attributed	  to	  either	  an	  internal	  heritage	  effect,	  or	  an	  external	  heritage	  effect	  or	  a	  policy	  effect,	  we	  interpret	  the	  evident	  spatial	   trends	  within	  and	  near	  to	  the	  CA	  boundaries	  as	  strong	  evidence	  of	  a	  positive	  external	  heritage	  effect.	  Moreover,	  the	  relatively	   large	  and	  positive	  discontinuity	  at	   the	  boundary	   indicates	   that	   the	  potentially	  nega-­‐tive	  policy	  effects	  associated	  with	  a	  location	  in	  a	  conservation	  area	  on	  property	  values,	  if	  at	  all	  present,	  are	  relatively	  small	  compared	  to	  the	  (internal	  and	  external)	  heritage	  benefits.	  
Fig.	  1.	   Internal	  and	  external	  CA	  effects
	  	  Notes:	  	   Black	  solid	  (dashed)	  lines	  shows	  point	  estimates	  (95%	  CI).	  Positive	  (negative)	  distances	  denote	  internal	  (external)	  distance	  from	  the	  CA	  border.	  	  	  
4 Survey	  analysis	  
4.1 CA	  selection	  Our	  qualitative	  analysis	  builds	  on	  111	  in-­‐depth	  residential	  interviews	  conducted	  in	  the	  nine	  CA	  according	  as	  described	  in	  Table	  2.	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Tab.	  2.	   Qualitative	  Case	  Study	  Selection 
Step	  1 Step	  2 Step	  3 Step	  4 
Inner	  London 
High	  Premium High	  Deprivation De	  Beauvoir	  (Hackney) 
Low	  Deprivation Ladbroke	  (RBKC) 
Low	  Premium High	  Deprivation St	  Marks	  (Hackney) 
Low	  Deprivation Courtfields	  (RBKC) 
Outer	  London 
High	  Premium High	  Deprivation Brentham	  Gardens	  (Ealing) Low	  Deprivation Sheen	  Road	  (Richmond) 
Low	  Premium High	  Deprivation Bowes	  Park	  (Haringey) Low	  Deprivation St	  Matthias	  (Richmond) 
Outside	  London Low	  Premium X Overcliffe	  (Gravesham) 
	  Our	  CA	  selection	  model,	  reflected	  in	  the	  table	  above,	  was	  guided	  by	  the	  quantitative	  data	  and	  is	  predicated	  on	  property	  price	  premia,	  which	  we	  estimate	  as	  the	  difference	  in	  average	  property	  prices	  just	  inside	  and	  outside	  around	  CA	  boundaries.3	  	  We	  chose	  CAs,	  which	  we	  describe	  in	  more	  detail	  below,	  with	  high	  and	  low	  price	  premia	  located	  in	  inner	  and	  outer	  London.	  	  In	  addition,	  we	  used	  the	  2007	  Indices	  of	  Multiple	  Deprivation	  to	  select	  areas	  that	  were	  considered	  to	  be	  at	  the	  higher	  and	  lower	  ends	  of	  the	  deprivation	  scale.	  	  One	  area	  was	  also	  selected	  outside	  of	  London	  to	  add	  richness	  to	  the	  data.	  	  	  
	  De	  Beauvoir	  CA	  is	  located	  in	  the	  London	  Borough	  of	  Hackney	  and	  was	  designated	  in	  1971	  and	  further	  extended	  in	  1977	  and	  1998.	  	  It	  is	  notable	  as	  the	  first	  large-­‐scale,	  planned	  housing	  devel-­‐opment	  in	  Hackney	  and	  its	  formal	  street	  patterns,	  consistent	  architectural	  style	  and	  layout	  are	  in	  stark	  contrast	  to	  the	  relative	  informality	  and	  irregularity	  of	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  borough.	  	  The	  area	  suffered	  considerable	  decline	   from	   the	  1930s	  and	  by	   the	  1950s	  Hackney’s	  wholesale	   redevel-­‐opment	  plan	   threatened	   the	  area	  with	  demolition.	   	  However,	  with	   the	  publication	  of	   the	  Civic	  Amenities	   Act	   in	   1967	   and	   considerable	   action	   from	   an	   active	   local	   residents	   association	   the	  area	   was	   preserved.	   	   De	   Beauvoir	   also	   experiences	   similar	   pressures	   to	   many	   inner	   London	  neighbourhoods	  with	  high	  housing	  costs,	  wealth	  disparities	  and	  pressure	  to	  find	  sites	  for	  higher	  density	  development.	  	  
	  The	  Ladbroke	  Estate	  is	  located	  in	  the	  Royal	  Borough	  of	  Kensington	  and	  Chelsea	  and	  was	  desig-­‐nated	  as	  a	  CA	  in	  1969	  making	  it	  one	  the	  first	  in	  the	  borough.	  It	  was	  developed	  in	  the	  19th	  Centu-­‐ry	  and	   is	   situated	   in	   the	  now	   fashionable	  Notting	  Hill.	   	  Like	  De	  Beauvoir,	   the	  Ladbroke	  Estate	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3  We compare prices within 1km area inside and outside conservation areas and only consider those conserva-
tion areas with at least five transactions each of the to two areas (inside/outside). We adjust prices for local 
time trends. See the notes in Figure 5 for additional detail. 
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also	   suffered	   from	   dilapidation	   and	   property	   subdivision	   after	   the	   war.	   However,	   unlike	   De	  Beauvoir	  the	  area	  has	  experienced	  a	  significant	  rise	  in	  property	  values,	  driven	  at	  least	  in	  part	  by	  substantial	  interest	  from	  wealthy	  foreign	  investors	  looking	  for	  property	  in	  London.	  This	  has	  led	  to	  a	  diminution	  of	  “traditional”	  residents,	  a	  comment	  made	  to	  us	   frequently	   in	  our	  surveys.	   In	  addition	  to	  this	  ‘loss	  of	  the	  typical	  resident’,	  Ladbroke	  is	  also	  faced	  with	  other	  unique	  develop-­‐ment	  pressures	  brought	  by	  an	  influx	  of	  capital	  and	  tight	  planning	  regulations,	  which	  limit	  how	  homes	  can	  be	  expanded.	  Chief	  amongst	  these	  concerns	  is	  the	  rise	  in	  the	  number	  of	  subterranean	  extensions	  in	  the	  area.	  The	  general	  features	  to	  consider	  in	  Ladbroke	  are	  its	  relative	  architectural	  integrity;	  its	  history	  as	  an	  outstanding	  and	  longstanding	  CA	  in	  the	  borough;	  its	  location	  relative	  to	  central	  London;	   its	   fashionable	  position	  as	  a	  part	  of	  Notting	  Hill;	  and	   internal	  development	  pressure	  to	  add	  value	  to	  homes.	  	  
	  St	  Mark’s	  CA	  like	  De	  Beauvoir	  it	  is	  located	  in	  the	  London	  Borough	  of	  Hackney.	  In	  2007	  a	  CA	  ap-­‐praisal	  was	   completed	   for	   the	   area	   laying	  out	   its	   history,	   its	   local	   value	   and	   its	   strengths	   and	  weakness.	  St	  Mark’s	  is	  noted	  as	  an	  enclave	  of	  fairly	  well	  preserved	  middle	  class	  Victorian	  specu-­‐lative	  development,	  which	  was	  laid	  out	  and	  built	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1860s.	  	  Interestingly,	  as	  this	  devel-­‐opment	  was	  speculative	  it	  does	  not	  have	  the	  ‘planned’	  aspects	  that	  some	  of	  our	  other	  CAs	  pos-­‐sess.	  St	  Mark’s	  has	  the	  advantage	  of	  having	  many	  listed	  buildings	  and	  Buildings	  of	  Townscape	  Merit	  along	  with	  several	  surviving	  front	  gardens	  in	  the	  Victorian	  houses,	  numerous	  street	  trees	  and	  green	  spaces,	  especially	   those	  around	  St	  Mark’s	  church,	  all	  of	  which	  add	   to	   its	   residential	  character	  and	  help	  to	  create	  a	  sense	  of	  local	  coherence.	  	  However,	  it	  is	  situated	  near	  a	  very	  busy	  road;	  litter	  is	  a	  problem;	  there	  is	  a	  lack	  of	  public	  open	  space;	  some	  areas	  and	  houses	  appear	  ne-­‐glected	  and	  there	  has	  been	  some	  loss	  of	  architectural	  character	  (especially	  windows	  and	  doors)	  (Hackney,	  2008,	  pp.	  38-­‐39).	  	  
	  Courtfields	  CA	  is	  located	  in	  the	  Royal	  Borough	  of	  Kensington	  and	  Chelsea	  and	  bounded	  by	  sev-­‐eral	  major	  roads	  was	  designated	  in	  a	  piecemeal	  fashion	  beginning	  in	  1971	  and	  culminating	  in	  a	  final	  extension	  in	  1985,	  which	  expanded	  it	   to	  what	   is	  seen	  to-­‐day.	   	  Courtfields	  contains	  a	  mix-­‐ture	  of	  properties	  from	  the	  1870s	  many	  of	  which	  are	  2-­‐3	  storey	  terraces	  and	  paired	  villas	  with	  stucco;	  later	  properties	  from	  the	  1890-­‐1900s	  are	  typically	  brick	  in	  a	  reaction	  against	  the	  earlier	  Italianate	  properties	  of	   the	  1870s;	   and	   there	  are	   some	  mews	  developments,	  which	  have	  been	  converted	  to	  residential	  use.	  There	  are	  also	  a	  number	  of	  notable	  private	  garden	  squares	  in	  the	  CA.	   	   In	   the	   period	   following	   the	   First	  World	  War	   up	   until	   the	  mid-­‐1980s	  many	   of	   the	   homes	  were	  converted	  to	  multiple	  occupancy	  and	  some	  buildings	  were	  converted	  to	  hotel	  use	  as	  fami-­‐
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lies	  could	  no	   longer	  afford	   to	  occupy	  entire	  structures	   (RBKC,	  1985,	  p.	  2).	  Current	   features	   to	  consider	  in	  Courtfields	  are	  pressures	  caused	  by	  hotel	  developments	  and	  traffic.	  
	  Located	  in	  the	  London	  Borough	  of	  Ealing,	  Brentham	  Gardens	  was	  designated	  as	  a	  CA	  in	  1969.	  It	  was	  developed	  in	  the	  early	  20th	  century	  based	  on	  the	  principles	  of	  the	  Garden	  City	  movement	  and	  follows	  the	  designs	  of	  Raymond	  Unwin	  and	  Barry	  Parker,	  the	  architects	  of	  Letchworth	  Gar-­‐den	  City	  and	  Hampstead	  Garden	  Suburb	  (Ealing	  Council,	  2008,	  p.	  4).	  It	  was	  founded	  with	  social	  aims	  in	  mind	  and	  was	  a	  leader	  in	  the	  co-­‐partnership	  suburb	  movement.	  There	  are	  roughly	  650	  cottages	   and	  houses	   on	   the	   estate	   along	  with	   recreational	   facilities	   and	   allotments;	   the	   street	  pattern	  is	  curvilinear	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  surrounding	  rectilinear	  streets	  and	  terrace	  housing.	  This	  and	  many	   cottage	   style	   properties	   give	   Brentham	  Gardens	   a	   village	   like	   quality.	   The	   primary	  factors	  influencing	  the	  area	  are	  its	  overall	  coherence	  as	  a	  planned	  development;	  its	  active	  amen-­‐ity	  society	  and	  pressure	  from	  homeowners	  to	  extend	  and	  alter	  their	  properties	  not	  considered	  suitable	  for	  modern	  life.	  
	  The	  Sheen	  Road	  CA	  is	  located	  in	  the	  London	  Borough	  of	  Richmond	  and	  was	  designated	  in	  1977.	  It	  forms	  part	  of	  the	  linear	  development	  that	  links	  Richmond	  with	  East	  Sheen.	  Its	  buildings	  date	  from	  the	  18th	  century	  to	  the	  late	  19th	  century	  and,	  as	  a	  busy	  urban	  road,	  it	  is	  characterised	  by	  mixed	  use	  from	  small	  businesses	  to	  residential.	  Notably	  the	  road	  contains	  two	  mid-­‐19th	  century	  almshouses	  -­‐	  the	  Hickeys	  and	  Houblons	  both	  of	  which	  have	  a	  courtyard	  style.	  Residential	  prop-­‐erties	  in	  the	  area	  tend	  to	  be	  set	  within	  gardens	  with	  mature	  trees.	  There	  are	  also	  rows	  of	  large	  terraced	  houses	  to	  the	  north	  of	  Sheen	  Road.	  The	  primary	  issues	  for	  Sheen	  Road	  have	  come	  from	  unsympathetic	   alterations	   causing	   the	   loss	   of	   traditional	   architectural	   features;	   loss	   of	   front	  gardens	   to	   parking;	   lack	   of	   coordinated	   and	   poor	   quality	   street	   furniture	   and	   paving;	   traffic	  domination	   and	   a	   poor	   cluttered	   pedestrian	   environment;	   and	   the	   loss	   of	   original	   shopfronts	  (Richmond	  Borough	  Council,	  undated-­‐a,	  p.	  1).	  	  
	  Bowes	  Park	  CA	  is	  located	  in	  the	  London	  Borough	  of	  Haringey,	  although	  part	  of	  the	  Bowes	  Park	  development	  is	  also	  in	  the	  London	  Borough	  of	  Enfield.	  It	  was	  designated	  a	  CA	  in	  1994	  and	  de-­‐velopment	  is	  primarily	  of	  a	  Victorian	  suburban	  character	  with	  a	  variety	  of	  early	  Victorian	  hous-­‐ing,	  including	  semi-­‐detached	  villas	  and	  small	  and	  large	  terraced	  houses.	  Many	  of	  the	  older	  hous-­‐es	   are	   in	   yellow	   brick.	   Newer	   homes	   are	   often	   in	   soft	   red	   brick	   of	   the	   Queen	   Anne	   Revival.	  Bowes	  Park	  also	  has	  one	  of	  the	  best	  preserved	  Victorian	  shopping	  areas	  in	  the	  Borough	  in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  Myddleton	  Road,	  which,	  according	  to	  the	  Supplementary	  Planning	  Guidance	  (SPG),	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has	  been	  described	  by	  local	  people	  as	  “...a	  jewel	  in	  decline	  (Haringey	  Council,	  1999,	  p.	  2).	  Since	  the	  publication	  of	  the	  SPG	  the	  road	  has	  gone	  through	  further	  decline	  with	  a	  loss	  of	  some	  of	  the	  traditional	  shops	  like	  the	  bakeries	  and	  butchers.	  In	  addition,	  few	  of	  the	  original	  shopfronts	  re-­‐main	  unaltered.	  Current	   features	   to	  consider	   in	   this	  area	  are	  overall	   levels	  of	  deprivation	  and	  pressures	  from	  home	  and	  business	  owners	  wishing	  to	  alter	  their	  properties.	  
	  St	  Matthias	  CA	  was	  designated	  in	  1977;	  the	  area’s	  focal	  point	  is	  St	  Matthias’	  Church,	  which	  was	  consecrated	  in	  1856	  during	  the	  period	  when	  the	  South	  Western	  Railway	  was	  extended	  to	  Rich-­‐mond.	  The	  extension	  of	  the	  railway	  brought	  with	  it	  development.	  Here	  this	  was	  in	  the	  form	  of	  primarily	  high-­‐class	  villas	  on	  the	  slopes	  of	  the	  hill	  leading	  up	  to	  the	  church.	  In	  terms	  of	  architec-­‐tural	  style,	  St	  Matthias	  has	  a	  mix	  of	  mid	  and	  late	  Victorian	  buildings	  ranging	  from	  large	  detached	  villas	  to	  terraced	  mews.	  The	  townscape	  is	  considered	  to	  be	  of	  high	  quality	  (Richmond	  Borough	  Council,	  Undated-­‐b,	  p.	  1)	  with	  a	  variety	  of	  building	   styles	   and	  architectural	  details	   along	  with	  front	   gardens	   forming	  a	   cohesive	   residential	  mix.	   St	  Matthias	   is	   also	   located	  near	   to	   the	   river	  Thames,	   the	   Terrace	   Gardens	   and	   Richmond	   Park,	   offering	   a	   number	   of	   nearby	   amenities	   to	  residents.	  The	  council	  notes	  in	  their	  CA	  appraisal	  that	  development	  pressure,	  which	  could	  dam-­‐age	  this	  landscape	  setting	  via	  the	  obstruction	  of	  views,	  skylines	  and	  landmarks	  to	  be	  of	  concern	  along	  with	  the	  loss	  of	  architectural	  features,	  loss	  of	  front	  gardens	  for	  parking,	  and	  a	  domination	  of	  traffic	  (Richmond	  Borough	  Council,	  Undated-­‐b,	  p.	  2).	  
	  Overcliffe	  was	  selected	  as	  an	  exemplar	  of	  a	  CA	  outside	  of	  London.	  	  Overcliffe	  is	  part	  of	  the	  early	  19th	  century	  Rosherville	  New	  Town	  development	  in	  Northfleet	  and	  was	  developed	  in	  the	  mid-­‐19th	   century.	   The	   area	   is	   a	  mixture	   of	   villas	   and	   terraced	   houses,	   some	   of	   which	   have	   views	  northward	  toward	  the	  river	  Thames.	  The	  area	  is	  valued	  for	  the	  survival	  of	  its	  historic	  layout,	  its	  historic	  buildings	  and	  its	  location	  on	  top	  of	  the	  chalk	  cliffs	  (Gravesham	  Borough	  Council,	  2009,	  p.	   1).	   There	   are	   a	   number	   of	   features	   that	   impact	   on	   the	   area,	   including	   high	   traffic	   volumes	  along	  some	  of	  the	  roads;	  poor	  quality	  modern	  buildings	  both	  inside	  and	  just	  outside	  the	  CA;	  loss	  of	  architectural	  features;	  graffiti;	  and	  the	  dominance	  of	  parked	  cars	  in	  the	  area.	  
4.2 	  Valuing	  neighbourhoods	  	  The	  external	  heritage	  effect,	  a	  non-­‐market	  externality,	  sets	  the	  stage	  for	  the	  prisoners’	  dilemma.	  	  In	  order	  for	  co-­‐operation	  to	  emerge,	  residents	  must	  have	  an	  awareness	  of	  the	  added	  value	  of	  the	  characteristics	   of	   their	   neighbourhood	   and	   correspondingly	   the	   value	   preservation	   brings	   to	  their	   properties.	  We	   argue	   that	   ideally	   they	   should	   also	   ‘value’	   the	   characteristics	   that	  make	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their	   area	  distinctive	   to	   embed	   these	   into	   local	  place-­‐based	  narratives,	  which	  will	   help	   to	  un-­‐derpin	   culturally	   reproductive	   strategies	   with	   respect	   to	   co-­‐operative	   behaviour	   (Taylor	   &	  Nowak,	  2007).	  	  To	  appropriate	  the	  regulation	  as	  a	  tool	  that	  reduces	  the	  transaction	  cost	  of	  coor-­‐dination,	  residents	  must	  also	  understand	  and	  support	  the	  policy.	  To	  better	  explain	  these	  factors,	  we	  will	   present	   evidence	   taken	   from	   the	   surveys	   and	   interviews	   that	  were	   conducted	   in	   our	  nine	  CAs.	  
	  In	  the	  first	   instance,	  residents	  were	  asked	  if	  they	  would	  describe	  their	  neighbourhoods	  as	  dis-­‐tinctive	  on	  a	  five-­‐point	  scale	  where	  1	  was	  very	  distinctive	  and	  5	  was	  not	  distinctive	  at	  all.	  	  As	  can	  be	  seen	  in	   fig.	  2	  the	  majority	  (apx	  70%)	  of	  respondents	  viewed	  their	  neighbourhood	  as	  either	  very	  distinctive	  or	  distinctive,	  indicating	  that	  there	  was	  a	  general	  understanding	  amongst	  resi-­‐dents	  that	  the	  area	  was	  special	   in	  some	  way.	   	  We	  also	  gave	  those	  surveyed	  the	  opportunity	  to	  compare	  their	  neighbourhood	  to	  neighbouring	  districts.	   	  Here	  they	  were	  asked	  to	  describe	  the	  physical	  attractiveness	  their	  area,	  again	  on	  a	  five-­‐point	  scale.	  	  Fig.	  3	  shows	  that	  just	  over	  60%	  of	  residents	  believed	  that	  their	  neighbourhood	  was	  either	  much	  more	  or	  more	  attractive	  relative	  to	  other	  nearby	  districts	  again	  indicating	  that	  residents	  viewed	  their	  areas	  as	  somehow	  unique.	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Fig.	  2.	   Area	  distinctiveness	  
	  
Fig.	  3.	   Area	  attractiveness 
 
Next, residents were asked to rank how expensive they perceived their area was relative to the sur-
rounding areas. More than 75% ranked their area as expensive or very expensive (see fig 4). Based on 
the answers we created an index of relative affordability by CA and compared the results to the price 
premium we estimated based on transactions in and around the respective CAs (see Fig. 5). The evi-
dence suggests that with the exception of Courtfields, owners were well aware of local “value” in 
their area. In another question we asked, more than 80% of those who responded reported that being 
in a CA had an impact on the value of their property. 
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Fig.	  4.	   Relative	  affordability 
	  
Fig.	  5.	   Effective	  and	  self-­‐reported	  (relative)	  price	  level	  
	  Notes:	  	   Owner’s	  rating	  is	  on	  a	  -­‐2	  to	  +2	  scale.	  CA	  premia	  is	  the	  𝛽!	  coefficient	  recovered	  from	  separate	  regression	  for	  each	  CA	  n	  of	  the	  following	  type:	  log 𝑃!"# = 𝛼! + 𝛽!"𝐶𝐴𝐷!"# + 𝜉!"𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅! + 𝜀!"# ,	  where	  CAD	  is	  a	  0,1	  indi-­‐cated	  for	  whether	  a	  transaction	  takes	  place	  within	  CA	  n,	  and	  YEAR	  refers	  to	  the	  year	  of	  transaction.	  Each	  regression	  considers	  transaction	  that	  occurred	  within	  1km of the CA boundary (inside or outside)	  
	  Whilst	  the	  survey	  data	  gives	  us	  a	  gross	  understanding	  that	  residents	  believed	  their	  areas	  to	  be	  attractive	  and	  distinctive	  and	  that	  this	  belief	  was	  correlated	  with	  price	  premia,	  it	  does	  not	  give	  us	  a	  qualitative	  picture	  of	  what	  residents	  valued.	  	  To	  do	  this,	  our	  researchers	  asked	  residents	  a	  series	  of	  open-­‐ended	  questions	  designed	  to	  give	  us	  a	  better	  understanding	  about	  how	  residents	  viewed	  their	  neighbourhoods.	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 When asked what they liked best about living their area, residents spoke extensively about the quality 
of the buildings, green spaces and neighbours.  For our purposes, we will look specifically at the re-
sponses that were directed towards the built environment to help better elucidate the findings from our 
survey.  Our case studies residents commented on aspects of the built form. Narratives developed 
included discussions around heritage and historic architecture, estate layout and overall building 
maintenance in eight4 of the areas that we studied. This indicates that residents were considering as-
pects of the built environment to be integral to their enjoyment and understanding of their neighbour-
hoods, which matches well with our survey data. 
 However, whilst our neighbourhoods engaged with built environment narratives, residents of our high 
deprivation/ high premium cases were far more likely to make very specific comments on heritage 
and architectural style.  This is perhaps because both Brentham Gardens and De Beauvoir were origi-
nally planned estates with a high degree of architectural integrity.  However, the comments made by 
these inhabitants are a testament to the level of passion they had for their homes.  In Brentham Gar-
dens the area was noted for its village and cottagy feel with one resident remarking that they loved the 
“…arts and craft movement feel about the place with all of its quirkiness and unexpected nooks and 
crannies.”.  In De Beauvoir residents too described it as a village and noted that the Victorian houses 
felt “typically English with a good sense of heritage” reflecting Lowenthal’s (1985, 1996) notions of 
the cultural values of heritage.  
4.3 	  Residents	  and	  regulation	  	  Having	  established	  the	  value	  residents	  place	  on	   living	   in	  what	  they	  view	  as	  attractive	  and	  dis-­‐tinctive	  areas	  we	  will	  now	  turn	  to	  the	  third	  part	  of	  our	  puzzle:	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  regulation	  is	  used	  to	  enforce	  CA	  policy.	  	  Here	  we	  will	  see	  how	  a	  form	  of	  reciprocity	  is	  produced	  amongst	  resi-­‐dents	  and	  how	  CA	  policy	  acts	  as	  a	  framework	  for	  building	  up	  co-­‐ordination	  and	  co-­‐operation.	  
 If CA policy is to be effective in overcoming the prisoners’ dilemma, residents need to feel confident 
in using the tools made available to them.  One of the most important mechanisms for this is the right 
of objection to requests to alter properties within the CA.  It would be surmised that in order to be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4  O ur ninth area, Overcliffe, only commented on the built environment once.  Here the Victorian architecture 
was mentioned as old and beautiful but in need of restoration.  These comments fit well with the distinc-
tiveness and attractiveness scores given to the area by residents as well as the relative price measures in fig. 
4, all of which were at the low end of the spectrum.  
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effective, residents must be aware of the right to object and must be able to use this when they feel 
necessary.  In our sample, just over 40% of residents surveyed said that they had objected to a neigh-
bour’s request for planning permission and this 40% remained constant when the areas were sub-
divided into high/low premium and high/low deprivation. 
 In itself this is a striking finding, indicating that residents were more than willing to make formal ob-
jections when they believed that applications were inappropriate.  If we delve into this further through 
the interview data we uncover the attitudes driving this behaviour.  In our high premium areas three 
factors emerged as significant when objections were made.  The first, and perhaps the most expected, 
is that residents object when they feel directly threatened by change.  Here being overlooked, the loss 
of sunlight or the disruption of a cherished view were the reasons most often mentioned for lodging an 
objection and relate perhaps most strongly with the private enjoyment of personal property rather than 
to any heritage or aesthetic quality the neighbourhood might have.  However, these are also features 
that impact on how owners value their homes and how they may interact with their properties. 
 The second feature is of more interest to us and included the role of amenity societies (groups dedi-
cated to maintaining and enhancing the area’s heritage) and general neighbourhood pressure when 
residents made objections.  For example, in Brentham Gardens several respondents mentioned the 
existence of the Brentham Society and noted that they were frequently responsible for helping to or-
ganise objections to planning permissions they saw as inappropriate.  In Ladbroke interview data sug-
gested the vital role citizens played in reporting development that did not meet CAC requirements 
commenting that, “Whilst the council is there to intervene in these matters, it is up to us as residents to 
report any breaches.”.  The same pattern held true for De Beauvoir, where conservation officers noted 
that the local amenity society and to a large extent the residents were their “eyes and ears” on the 
ground and were instrumental in mounting challenges to inappropriate development.  This “eyes and 
ears” function is vitally important, as English planning enforcement can be typified as being reactive 
and responsive rather than systematic and all encompassing, with a great deal of enforcement reliant 
upon the general public’s reporting of breaches (Harris, 2013). 
 In Ladbroke an even more interesting pattern emerged with neighbours discussing the pressure they 
felt about altering the area.  One homeowner told the story of a neighbour who had been given per-
mission to alter the roofline of her property but that neighbours felt that this would negatively impact 
the skyline near the garden square.  She stated, “…there was such pressure in the neighbourhood that 
despite the approval the person did not go ahead with the build.”.  Similarly the conservation officer 
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in Richmond, where Sheen Road was our high premia CA, reported that frequently residents felt pres-
sure to replace old wooden sash windows with new wooden sash windows rather than the cheaper 
uPVC type despite local regulation not requiring this.  Here she noted that residents typically mim-
icked the behaviour of their neighbours.  In each instance we see what Taylor and Nowak (2007) 
might refer to as cultural reproduction, a form of indirect reciprocity, where individuals are imitated 
by others and thereby the strategies they adopt are then reproduced.  These strategies are vital to the 
production of a culture that supports the integrity of the CA and helps to create co-operation amongst 
residents. 
 Finally residents in high premium areas did raise objections that were solely based on maintaining the 
character and the heritage of the area indicating that heritage narratives were embedded in these CAs.  
This included objections to changes in the style or form of properties and to the removal of significant 
trees from the landscape.  Planning officers for these areas independently corroborated this noting that 
residents in these CAs had a “heightened awareness of conservation” and were intent on “keeping the 
character of the area and stopping detrimental development.”.  In our low premium areas, whilst the 
propensity to object was as high, the reasoning behind objections was less well developed and articu-
lated.   
4.4 	  Attitudes	  about	  planning	  	  Finally	  for	  the	  system	  to	  be	  successful	  there	  needs	  to	  be	  more	  than	  a	  simple	  willingness	  to	  ob-­‐ject,	  there	  also	  needs	  to	  be	  a	  recognition	  that	  the	  system	  is	  generally	  functioning	  and	  is	  fit	  for	  purpose.	  There	  also	  needs	  to	  be	  a	  recognition	  that	  the	  costs	  placed	  on	  homeowners	  in	  CAs	  are	  outweighed	  by	  the	  benefits	  they	  receive	  in	  added	  property	  value	  and	  amenity	  value.	  	  In	  order	  to	  understand	  these	  attitudes	  we	  asked	  respondents	  a	  series	  of	  questions	  designed	  to	  better	  un-­‐derstand	  their	  attitudes	  toward	  planning	  constraints.	  	  We	  have	  divided	  our	  responses	  by	  tenure	  as	  it	  might	  be	  expected	  that	  renters,	  who	  in	  theory	  bare	  no	  costs	  from	  planning	  constraints	  would	  be	  more	  positive	  about	  them	  than	  would	  homeowners.	  	  We	  also	  divided	  our	  responses	  by	  those	  who	  had	  and	  had	  not	  previously	  applied	  for	  planning	  permission.	  	  As	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  fig.	  6	  and	  7	  not	  only	  do	  homeowners	  not	  see	  constraints	  as	  any	  particular	  problem	  they	  also	  agree	  that	  the	  planning	  system	  is	  the	  best	  way	  for	  maintaining	  the	  attractiveness	  of	  the	  area.	  	  When	  these	  figures	  are	  then	  broken	  down	  into	  those	  respondents	  who	  had	  applied	  for	  planning	  per-­‐mission	  we	  see	  that	  residents	  who	  previously	  applied	  for	  permission	  feel	  even	  more	  positively	  about	  the	  system	  than	  those	  who	  did	  not.	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Fig.	  6.	   Constraints	  on	  property	  owners	  
 
Fig.	  7.	   The	  planning	  system	  and	  protection 
 
	  Looking	  at	  the	  textual	  data	  we	  see	  several	  instances	  where,	  even	  when	  planning	  permission	  has	  been	  denied	  to	  an	  owner	  they	  remark	  on	  the	  overall	  reasonableness	  of	  the	  decision.	   	  As	  noted	  by	  one	  resident,	  “So,	   it	  was	  a	  decision	  that	  went	  against	  us	  as	  individuals,	  but	  I	  thought	  that	  it	  was	  probably	  correct	  in	  a	  more	  overall	  perspective.”.	   	  These	  comments	  were	  further	  strength-­‐ened	  by	  a	  homeowner	  who	  reflected	  that	  the	   local	  council	  put	   in	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  effort	  and	  re-­‐sources	   to	  help	  preserve	   local	  heritage,	  which	   in	  her	  words	  helped	  residents	  have	   “an	  overall	  mind-­‐set	   towards	  heritage”.	   	  Again	  we	  see	  how	  group	   level	   selection	  (Taylor	  &	  Nowak,	  2007)	  and	  an	  ethos	  of	   greater	   good	   can	  be	  produced	   through	   regulation	  and	  education	  provided	  by	  local	  planning	  officers.	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5 Escaping	  the	  dilemma?	  
Literature	  on	  valuing	  built	  heritage	  often	  approaches	  the	  question	  from	  either	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  the	  financial	  impact	  designation	  has	  on	  property	  (Zahirovic-­‐Herbert	  &	  Chatterjee,	  2012,	  Ahl-­‐feldt	  &	  Maennig,	  2010;	  Diaz	  et	  al,	  2008,	  Leichenko	  et	  al,	  2001,	  Koster,	  Van	  Ommeren,	  &	  Rietveld,	  2012)	  or	  as	  a	  window	  into	  meanings	  of	  heritage	  and	  its	  value	  as	  a	  public	  policy	  goal	  (Lowenthal,	  1985;	  Lowenthal,	  1996;	  Townshend	  &	  Pendlebury,	  1999;	  Pendlebury,	  2009).	  	  These	  more	  bina-­‐ry	  approaches	  obscure	  deeper	  understandings	  of	  the	  multiple	  values	  practiced	  in	  ordinary	  eco-­‐nomic	  geographies.	  	  In	  our	  paper	  we	  have	  sought	  to	  redress	  this	  by	  combining	  both	  quantitative	  econometric	  models	   of	   property	   price	   analysis	  with	   qualitative	   perceptions	   into	   local	   deriva-­‐tions	  and	  understanding	  of	  value.	   	   In	  so	  doing,	   the	  paper	  offers	  unique	  insights	   into	  conserva-­‐tion	  planning	  and	  the	  production	  of	  cooperative	  behaviour.	  	  
So	   then	   specifically,	  what	   can	   this	   study	   tell	   us	   about	   planning	   for	   heritage	   conservation	   and	  more	  importantly	  what	  broader	  lessons	  can	  planners	  take	  away	  to	  use	  in	  practice?	  In	  the	  first	  instance,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  heritage	  externalities	  do	  exist	  in	  CA	  and	  that	  these	  can	  motivate	  regula-­‐tion	   that	   endeavours	   to	   correct	   individually	   rational	   but	   collectively	   destructive	   behaviour	  through	  the	  establishment	  of	  legal	  rules	  and	  standards.	  	  As	  we	  have	  shown,	  the	  policy	  creates	  a	  framework	  in	  which	  residents	  are	  able	  to	  act	  in	  order	  to	  co-­‐ordinate	  their	  behaviour	  in	  a	  more	  favourable	  way.	  	  We	  have	  also	  shown,	  through	  the	  concepts	  of	  reciprocity	  and	  group	  level	  selec-­‐tion	   that	  residents	  can	  and	  do	  go	  beyond	  the	  mere	   legal	  scope	  of	   the	  regulation	   in	  both	  spirit	  and	  practice.	  	  They	  have	  faith	  in	  the	  planning	  system	  to	  preserve	  heritage,	  even	  when	  this	  con-­‐flicts	  with	  their	  own	  personal	  interests,	  and	  they	  at	  times	  choose	  not	  to	  act	  in	  a	  way	  that	  could	  be	  considered	  detrimental	   to	   local	  heritage	  values	  even	  when	   these	  actions	  would	  be	  allowed	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  regulation.	  	  The	  role	  planners	  play	  in	  helping	  to	  create	  local	  heritage	  narra-­‐tives	  through	  awareness	  raising	  and	  education	  was	  seen	  as	  important	  by	  residents.	  	  
	  Moving	  beyond	  heritage,	  we	  feel	  that	  this	  work	  can	  be	  applied	  to	  other	  forms	  of	  the	  prisoners’	  dilemma	   where	   common	   pool	   resources	   are	   at	   stake.	   	   The	   core	   lesson	   to	   be	   learned	   is	   that	  whilst	   regulation	  can	  provide	  a	   framework	   for	  co-­‐ordination,	   there	  must	  be	  other	   factors	   that	  help	  drive	  co-­‐operation.	  	  Our	  work	  would	  indicate	  that	  the	  building	  up	  of	  narratives	  and	  values	  around	  the	  non-­‐market	  based	  externality	  is	  vital	  if	  the	  prisoners’	  dilemma	  is	  to	  be	  escaped.	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  To	  rigorously	  analyse	  the	  effect	  conservation	  areas	  have	  on	  value	  with	  the	  methods	  described	  above,	  we	  have	   compiled	   a	   unique	  data	   set.	   This	   combines	  data	   on	   sales	   prices	   and	  property	  characteristics	   provided	   by	   the	  Nationwide	  Building	   Society,	   detailed	   information	   on	   location	  characteristics	  collected	  from	  various	  sources	  as	  well	  as	  a	  comprehensive	  digital	  map	  of	  conser-­‐vation	  areas	  in	  England	  accompanied	  by	  a	  detailed	  survey,	  both	  of	  which	  have	  been	  provided	  by	  English	  Heritage.	  Merging	  these	  data	  sets	  within	  a	  GIS	  environment	  sets	  the	  base	  for	  the	  com-­‐parison	  between	  sales	  prices	  of	  buildings	  inside	  and	  outside	  conservation	  areas.	  
Housing	  transactions	  
The	   transactions	  data	  relates	   to	  mortgages	   for	  properties	  granted	  by	   the	  Nationwide	  Building	  Society	  (NBS)	  between	  1995	  and	  2010.	  The	  data	  for	  England	  comprise	  1,088,446	  observations	  and	  include	  the	  price	  paid	  for	  individual	  housing	  units	  along	  with	  detailed	  property	  characteris-­‐tics.	   These	   characteristics	   include	   floor	   space	   (m²),	   the	   type	   of	   property	   (detached,	   semi-­‐detached,	   flat,	   bungalow	   or	   terraced),	   the	   date	   of	   construction,	   the	   number	   of	   bedrooms	   and	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bathrooms,	  garage	  or	  parking	  facilities	  and	  the	  type	  of	  heating.	  There	  is	  also	  some	  buyer	  infor-­‐mation	  including	  the	  type	  of	  mortgage	  (freehold	  or	  leasehold)	  and	  whether	  they	  are	  a	  first-­‐time	  buyer.	  
Importantly,	  the	  transaction	  data	  includes	  the	  full	  UK	  postcode	  of	  the	  property	  sold	  allowing	  it	  to	  be	  assigned	  to	  grid-­‐reference	  coordinates.	  With	  this	   information	  it	   is	  possible	  within	  a	  Geo-­‐graphical	   Information	   Systems	   (GIS)	   environment	   to	   calculate	   distances	   to	   conservation	   area	  borders	   and	   to	   determine	  whether	   the	   property	   lies	   inside	   or	   outside	   of	   these	   borders.	   Fur-­‐thermore	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  calculate	  distances	  and	  other	  spatial	  measures	  (e.g.	  densities)	  for	  the	  amenities	   and	   environmental	   characteristics	   that	   will	   be	   used	   as	   control	   variables.	   Since	   the	  data	  set	  refers	  to	  postcodes	  rather	  than	  individual	  properties,	  it	  is	  not	  possible,	  however,	  to	  ana-­‐lyse	  repeated	  sales	  of	  the	  same	  property.	  This	  is	  a	  limitation	  shared	  with	  most	  property	  transac-­‐tion	  data	  sets	  available	  in	  the	  England,	  including	  the	  land	  registry	  data.	  
Conservation	  areas	  	  
The	  GIS	  data	  on	  the	  English	  Heritage	  sites	   include	  the	  precise	  geographical	  definition	  of	  8,167	  conservation	  areas	  (CAs).	  In	  addition	  there	  is	  information	  on	  the	  date	  of	  designation,	  the	  type	  of	  CA	  (urban,	  suburban	  or	  rural),	  the	  land	  use	  (residential,	  mixed,	  commercial	  or	  industrial),	  and	  Article	  4	  status.1	  The	  data	  set	   furthermore	  contains	   information	  about	  areas	   that	  received	   the	  status	  of	  world	  heritage	  sites	  in	  England.1	  Evidence	  of	  community	  support	  and	  risk	  status	  comes	  from	  the	  Conservation	  Areas	  Survey	  and	  is	  provided	  by	  English	  Heritage.	  
Neighbourhood	  characteristics	  
The	  main	  variables	  on	  neighbourhood	  characteristics	  are	  median	   income	  and	  ethnic	  composi-­‐tion.	  The	  income	  data	  is	  a	  model-­‐based	  estimate	  of	  median	  household	  income	  produced	  by	  Ex-­‐perian	  for	  Super	  Output	  Areas	  of	  the	  lower	  level	  (LSOA).	  This	  is	  assigned	  to	  the	  transaction	  data	  based	  on	  postcode.	  The	  data	  on	  ethnicity	  is	  made	  available	  by	  the	  2001	  UK	  Census	  at	  the	  level	  of	  Output	  Area	  (OA).	  Shares	  of	  each	  of	  the	  16	  ethnic	  groups	  and	  a	  Herfindahl	  index1	  were	  comput-­‐ed	  to	  capture	  the	  ethnic	  composition	  of	  neighbourhoods.	  
Environmental	  variables	  
The	  environmental	  variables	  capture	  the	  amenity	  value	  of	  environmental	  designations,	  features	  of	  the	  natural	  environment,	  different	  types	  of	  land	  cover	  and	  different	  types	  of	  land	  use.	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Geographical	  data	  (in	  the	  form	  of	  ESRI	  shapefiles)	  for	  UK	  National	  Parks,	  Areas	  of	  Outstanding	  Natural	   Beauty	   and	   National	   Nature	   Reserves	   are	   available	   from	   Natural	   England.	   National	  Parks	  and	  Areas	  of	  Outstanding	  Natural	  Beauty	  are	  protected	  areas	  of	  countryside	  designated	  because	  of	  their	  significant	   landscape	  value.	  National	  Nature	  Reserves	  are	  “established	  to	  pro-­‐tect	   sensitive	   features	   and	   to	   provide	   ‘outdoor	   laboratories’	   for	   research”	   (National	   England	  website).	  Straight	   line	  distances	  to	  these	  designations	  were	  computed	  for	  the	  housing	  units	  as	  geographically	   located	   by	   their	   postcodes.	   Furthermore,	   density	   measures	   that	   take	   into	   ac-­‐count	  both	  the	  distance	  to	  and	  the	  size	  of	  the	  features	  were	  created.1	  
The	  location	  of	  lakes,	  rivers	  and	  coastline	  are	  available	  from	  the	  GB	  Ordinance	  Survey.	  Distance	  to	  these	  features	  is	  also	  computed	  for	  the	  housing	  units	  from	  the	  transaction	  data.	  The	  UK	  Land	  Cover	  Map	  produced	  by	   the	  Centre	   for	  Ecology	  and	  Hydrology	  describes	   land	  coverage	  by	  26	  categories	  as	  identified	  by	  satellite	  images.	  We	  follow	  Mourato	  et	  al.(2010)	  who	  construct	  nine	  broad	  land	  cover	  types	  from	  the	  26	  categories.	  Shares	  of	  each	  of	   these	  nine	  categories	   in	  1km	  grid	  squares	  are	  calculated	  and	  the	  housing	  units	  take	  on	  the	  value	  of	  the	  grid	  square	  in	  which	  they	  reside.	  
The	   generalised	   Land	   Use	   Database	   (GLUD)	   available	   from	   the	   Department	   for	   Communities	  and	  Local	  Government	  gives	  area	  shares	  of	  nine	  different	  types	  of	  land	  use	  within	  Super	  Output	  Areas,	   lower	   level	   (LSOA).	   These	   nine	   land	   use	   types	   are	   domestic	   buildings,	   non-­‐domestic	  buildings,	   roads,	   paths,	   rail,	   domestic	   gardens,	   green	   space,	   water	   and	   other	   land	   use.	   These	  shares	  are	  assigned	  to	  the	  housing	  units	  based	  on	  the	  LSOA	  in	  which	  they	  are	  located.	  
Amenities	  
The	  locational	  amenities	  variables	  capture	  the	  benefits	  a	  location	  offers	  in	  terms	  of	  accessibility,	  employment	   opportunities,	   schools	   quality	   and	   the	   proximity	   of	   cultural	   and	   entertainment	  establishments.	  
Employment	  accessibility	  is	  captured	  both	  by	  the	  distance	  to	  Travel	  to	  Work	  Area	  (TTWA)	  cen-­‐troid	  and	  a	  measure	  of	   employment	  potentiality.	  TTWAs	  are	  defined	   such	   that	  75	  per	   cent	  of	  employees	  who	  work	   in	   the	   area	   also	   live	  within	   that	   area.	  Thus	   they	   represent	   independent	  employment	  zones	  and	  the	  distance	  to	   the	  centre	  of	   these	  zones	   is	  a	  proxy	   for	  accessibility	   to	  employment	  locations.	  A	  more	  complex	  measure	  of	  accessibility	  is	  the	  employment	  potentiality	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index	  (Ahlfeldt,	  2011).1	  This	  is	  computed	  at	  the	  Super	  Output	  Area,	  lower	  level	  (LSOA)	  and	  rep-­‐resents	  an	  average	  of	  employment	  in	  neighbouring	  LSOAs	  weighted	  by	  their	  distance.	  
Key	  Stage	  2	  (ages	  7-­‐11)	  assessment	  scores	  are	  available	  from	  the	  Department	  for	  Education	  at	  the	  Super	  Output	  Area,	  middle	  layer	  (MSOA).	  School	  quality	  is	  thus	  captured	  at	  the	  housing	  unit	  level	  by	  computing	  a	  distance	  weighted	  average	  of	  the	  KS2	  scores	  of	  nearby	  MSOA	  centroids.1	  
Geographical	  data	  on	  the	  locations	  of	  motorways,	  roads,	  airports,	  rail	  stations	  and	  railtracks	  are	  available	   from	  the	  GB	  Ordinance	  Survey.	  Distances	  were	  computed	   from	  housing	  units	   to	  mo-­‐torways,	  A-­‐roads,	  B-­‐roads	  and	  rail	  stations	  to	  capture	  accessibility.	  Buffers	  zones1	  were	  created	  around	  the	  motorways	  and	  roads	  along	  with	  distance	  calculations	  to	  railtracks	  and	  airports	  in	  order	  to	  capture	  the	  disamenity	  noise	  effects	  of	  transport	  infrastructure.	  
Further	  data	  on	  local	  amenities	  were	  taken	  from	  the	  Ordinance	  Survey	  (police	  stations,	  places	  of	  worship,	   hospitals,	   leisure/sports	   centres)	   and	   OpenStreetMap	   (cafés,	   restaurants/fast	   food	  outlets,	   museums,	   nightclubs,	   bars/pubs,	   theatres/cinemas,	   kindergartens	   and	   monuments,	  memorials,	  monument,	  castles,	  attraction,	  artwork).	  Kernel	  densities	   for	   these	  amenities	  were	  computed	   for	   housing	   units	   using	   a	   kernel	   radius	   of	   2km	   and	   a	   quadratic	   kernel	   function	  (Silverman,	  1986).	  The	  radius	  of	  2km	  is	  consistent	  with	  amenities	  having	  a	  significant	  effect	  on	  property	  prices	  only	  when	  they	  are	  within	  walking	  distance.	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Table	  A1:	  Variable	  description	  
Dependent	  Variable	   	  
	  
Price	   Per	   square	  metre	   transaction	  price	   in	  £	  of	   the	   corresponding	  plot	   of	   land	   (ex-­‐
pressed	   as	   natural	   logarithm).	   Transaction	   data	   from	   the	   Nationwide	   Building	  
Society	  (NBS).	  
Independent	  Variables	   	  
	  
CA	  Effects	   Dummy	   variables	   denoting	   property	   transactions	   taking	   place	   within	   the	  
boundaries	  of	  an	  currently	  existing	  conservation	  area,	  in	  a	  conservation	  area	  at	  
the	  time	  when	  designated	  or	  where	  the	  designation	  date	  is	  unknown	  as	  well	  as	  
various	  buffer	  areas	  surrounding	  current	  or	  treated	  conservation	  areas.	  
	  
Fixed	  Effect	  Control	   Travel	   to	  Work	  Areas,	  nearest	   conservation	  area	  catchment	  areas	  and	   interac-­‐
tives	  with	  year	  effects	  
	  
Housing	  information	   Set	  of	  property	  variables	  from	  the	  NBS	  including:	  Number	  of	  bedrooms,	  number	  
of	  bathrooms,	  floor	  size	  (in	  square	  metre),	  new	  property	  (dummy),	  building	  age	  
(years),	  tenure	  (leasehold/freehold),	  central	  heating	  (full:	  gas,	  electric,	  oil,	  solid	  
fuel),	  central	  heating	  (partial:	  gas,	  electric,	  oil,	  solid	  fuel),	  garage	  (single	  or	  dou-­‐





Set	   of	   neighbourhood	   variables	   including:	   median	   income	   (2005,	   LSOA	   level),	  
share	  of	  white	  population	  at	  total	  population	  (2001	  census,	  output	  area	   level),	  
share	  of	  mixed	  population	  at	  total	  population	  (2001	  census,	  output	  area	  level),	  
share	  of	  black	  population	  at	   total	  population	   (2001	  census,	  output	  area	   level),	  
share	  of	  Asian	  population	  at	   total	  population	   (2001	  census,	  output	  area	   level),	  
share	  of	  Chinese	  population	  at	   total	  population	   (2001	  census,	  output	  area	   lev-­‐
el),	  Herfindahl	  of	  ethnic	  segregation	  (including	  population	  shares	  of	  White	  Brit-­‐
ish,	   White	   Irish,	   White	   others,	   Mixed	   Caribbean,	   Mixed	   Asian,	   Mixed	   Black,	  
Mixed	  other,	  Asian	  Indian,	  Asian	  Pakistani,	  Asian	  others,	  Black	  Caribbean,	  Black	  





Set	   of	   characteristic	   variables	   for	   conservation	   areas	   from	  English	  Heritage	   in-­‐
cluding:	  Conservation	  area	   land	  use	  (dummy	  variables	  for	  residential,	  commer-­‐
cial,	   industrial	  or	  mixed	   land	  use),	  conservation	  area	  type	   (dummy	  variable	   for	  
urban,	  suburban	  or	  rural	  type),	  conservation	  area	  size	  (dummy	  for	  areas	   larger	  
than	   mean	   of	   128,432.04	   square	   metres),	   conservation	   area	   (square	   metre),	  
conservation	  area	  has	  an	  Article	  4	  Direction	   implemented	  (dummy),	  oldness	  of	  
conservation	   area	   (dummy	   for	   areas	   older	   than	   mean	   of	   1981),	   conservation	  
area	   at	   risk	   (dummy),	   conservation	   area	   with	   community	   support	   (dummy),	  
conservation	  area	  is	  World	  Heritage	  Site	  (dummy)	  
	  
Environment	  Character-­‐
istics	  and	  Amenities	  
Set	   of	   locational	   variables	   processed	   in	  GIS	   including:	  National	   Parks	   (distance	  
to,	  density),	  Areas	  of	  Outstanding	  Beauty	  (distance	  to,	  density),	  Natural	  Nature	  
Reserves	   (distance	   to,	   density),	   distance	   to	   nearest	   lake,	   distance	   to	   nearest	  
river,	   distance	   to	   nearest	   coastline,	   land	   in	   1km	   square:	   Marine	   and	   coastal	  
margins;	   freshwater,	   wetland	   and	   flood	   plains;	   mountains,	   moors	   and	   heath-­‐
land;	   semi-­‐natural	   grassland;	   enclosed	   farmland;	   coniferous	  woodland;	   broad-­‐
leaved/mixed	  woodland;	  urban;	  inland	  bare	  ground	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Other	  amenities	   Set	   of	   locational	   variables	   created	   in	   GIS	   including:	   Average	   key	   stage	   2	   test	  
score	   (MSOA	   averages	   as	   well	   as	   interpolated	   in	   GIS),	   distance	   to	   electricity	  
transmission	  lines,	  A-­‐Roads	  (distance	  to,	  buffer	  dummy	  variables	  within	  170m),	  
B-­‐Roads	   (distance	   to,	  buffer	  dummy	  variable	  within	  85m),	  motorway	   (distance	  
to,	  buffer	  dummy	  variable	  within	  315m;	  buffer	  distances	   refer	   to	   the	  distance	  
were	  noise	  of	  maximum	  speed	  drops	  drown	  to	  50	  decibel),	  distance	  to	  all	   rail-­‐
way	   stations,	   distance	   to	   London	   Underground	   stations,	   distance	   to	   railway	  
tracks,	  distance	  to	  bus	  stations,	  distance	  to	  airports,	  densities	  of	  cafés,	   restau-­‐
rants/fast	   food	   places,	   museums,	   	   nightclubs,	   bars/pubs,	   theatres/cinemas,	  
kindergartens,	  monuments	  (memorial,	  monument,	  castles,	  attraction,	  artwork),	  
hospitals,	  sports/leisure	  centers,	  police	  stations	  and	  worship	  locations,	  distance	  
to	   Travel	   to	   Work	   Areas,	   employment	   potentiality	   (based	   on	   Travel	   to	   Work	  




Set	   of	   neighbourhood	  distance	   dummy	   variables	   created	   in	  GIS	   including:	  Dis-­‐
tances	  outside	  conservation	  area	  border	  (up	  to	  50m,	  100m,	  150m,	  200m,	  250m,	  
300m,	   350m,	   400m,	   1km,	   2km	   and	   3km),	   distances	   inside	   conservation	   area	  
border	  (up	  to	  50m,	  100m,	  150m,	  200m)	  
Further	  notes	  on	  data	  methods	  
1. Employment	  potentiality	  
The	  employment	  potentiality	   index	   is	  computed	  at	   the	  Super	  Output	  Area,	   lower	   level	   (LSOA)	  and	  represents	  an	  average	  of	  employment	  in	  neighbouring	  LSOAs	  weighted	  by	  their	  distances.	  Employment	  potentiality	  is	  calculated	  for	  each	  Lower	  Layer	  Super	  Output	  Area	  𝑖	  (LSOA)	  based	  on	  employment	  in	  all	  other	  LSOAs𝑗	  using	  the	  following	  equation:	  EP! = ! E!e!!  !!" , 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ  𝑖 ≠ 𝑗,	  
where  𝑑	   measures	   the	   straight	   line	   distance	   converted	   into	   average	   travel	   time	   and	   Employ-­‐ment	   the	   absolute	  number	  of	  workers	   in	   the	   respective	  LSOA.	  The	   indicator	   is	  weighted	  by	   a	  decay	  parametre	  of	  a =	  -­‐0.073	  as	  estimated	  by	  Ahlfeldt(2005).	  Internal	  distances	  are	  calculated	  as:	  
d!! = 13 Area!π 	  
2. Kernel	  densities	  for	  National	  Parks,	  Areas	  of	  Outstanding	  Natural	  Beauty	  and	  National	  Na-­‐
ture	  Reserves	  
The	  kernel	  density	  is	  a	  measure	  that	  takes	  into	  account	  both	  the	  proximity	  and	  the	  size	  of	  NPs,	  AONBs	  and	  NNRs.	  Every	  100x100m	  piece	  of	  designated	  area	  is	  assigned	  a	  point	  and	  the	  density	  of	   these	   resulting	  points	   calculated	   for	   10km	  kernels	   and	   a	   quadratic	   kernel	   function	   (Silver-­‐man,	   1986,	   p.	   76,	   equation	   4.5)around	   each	   housing	   unit	   using	   a	   kernel	   density	  method.	   The	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result	   is	   similar	   to	   calculating	   a	   share	   of	   NP	   area	  within	   a	   circle	   apart	   from	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  points	  are	  additionally	  weighted	  by	  distance	  to	  the	  housing	  units	  according	  to	  a	  normal	  distri-­‐bution.	  
3. Buffers	  for	  motorways	  and	  roads	  
The	  buffer	  sizes	  for	  the	  different	  roads	  are	  as	  follows:	  B-­‐Road	  (85m),	  A-­‐Road	  (170m)	  and	  Mo-­‐torway	  (315m).	  These	  distances	  are	  calculated	  based	  how	  far	  it	  is	  expected	  that	  the	  noise	  from	  traffic	   travelling	  at	   the	  speed	   limit	  of	   the	  respective	  roads	   (Steven,	  2005)	  would	  decline	   to	  an	  assumed	  disamenity	  threshold	  level	  of	  noise	  of	  50db	  (Nelson,	  2008).	  
4. Land	  cover	  map	  Broad	  Categories	  
Table	  A2:	  Land	  Cover	  Broad	  categories	  	  
1	   Marine	  and	  coastal	  margins	  
2	   Freshwater,	  wetlands	  and	  flood	  plains	  
3	   Mountains,	  moors	  and	  heathland	  
4	   semi-­‐natural	  grasslands	  
5	   Enclosed	  farmland	  
6	   Coniferous	  woodland	  
7	   broad-­‐leaved/mixed	  woodland	  
8	   urban	  
9	   Inland	  bare	  ground	  
	  Notes:	  Categories	  adopted	  from	  Mourato	  et	  al.	  (2010).	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